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As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legisla-
tures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly
representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and un-
impaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)
INTRODUCTION
Every ten years, as directed by the Constitution, the U.S. Census Bureau
conducts an "actual Enumeration" of American residents.' Upon release of the
official population numbers, U.S. congressional seats are reapportioned among
the states, depending on which states have gained seats and which have lost.
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State legislators then get to work developing new congressional and state legisla-
tive district maps to reflect both national and state-level population shifts over
the past decade. In most states, redistricting generally comes down to a legisla-
tive battle like any other, requiring the input of the state's legislative bodies and
the approval (or veto) of the Governor.
Partisan gerrymandering results when the party in power in the state
legislature redraws election districts to ensure the election or re-election of its
own members, while decreasing the political safety of party opponents. This is
largely done by "packing," moving voters from the opposition party into only a
few districts, or "cracking," splitting a population that would otherwise produce
a majority into minority portions of other districts. The result is a collection of
"safe" districts for the representatives of the party in power and the marginali-
zation of the opposition. In states where one party does not have sufficient
control of the state legislature to push through a completely lopsided partisan
gerrymander, state party leaders may instead collaborate on a bipartisan
sweetheart gerrymander, ensuring that each incumbent congressperson or legis-
lator remains safe from political challenge.
As it stands, state legislators responsible for drawing new district maps
remain free to manipulate district lines for maximum partisan advantage
without much fear of judicial obstruction. Though the Supreme Court estab-
lished that partisan gerrymandering cases are justiciable under the Equal
Protection Clause, a judicially manageable standard to regulate such gerry-
manders remains elusive.3 As a result, a problematic, albeit unsurprising, status
quo has emerged: The overwhelming result of redistricting has been rampant
self-dealing in the form of partisan gerrymandering. Instead of a system of
government that provides voters the opportunity to elect their representatives,
what has evolved is a flipped system that provides elected officials the opportu-
nity to choose their constituents. This essay will provide a glimpse of what has
been done, and what more we need to do, to break the pattern of partisan
redistricting and realize true representative democracy.
I. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF JUSTICIABILITY
The prevailing approach in challenging partisan gerrymandering is to seek
redress from the federal courts. When party leaders find themselves out of
power and thus shut out of the redistricting process, they turn to the courts to
demand a fair outcome. Yet the question remains whether judicial regulation of
election results (as opposed to judicial regulation of election procedures) is not
only appropriate, but productive.
2. For a review of various states' redistricting processes, scc THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/
topics/bd/bdy/bdy-us (last visited May 1, 2011).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
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A. The Reapportionment Revolution and the Promise of Equal
Representation
During the "Reapportionment Revolution" of the 1960s, the Supreme
Court decided a series of cases that definitively established the principle that
equal numbers of people deserve equal representation, or "one person,
one-vote." 4 Prior to this point, politicians simply chose not to redistrict as a way
of keeping themselves in power, freezing districts in time. As populations
shifted, however, antiquated district lines resulted in gross malapportionment
and severe dilution of the voting power of individuals in overpopulated
districts. The Reapportionment Revolution demanded that redistricting efforts
result in substantial population equality among election districts, according to
current population statistics, such that each person's vote is weighted equally.
The Supreme Court first opened the door to legal challenges to states' polit-
ical apportionment statutes in the 1962 landmark case Baker v. Carr.' In Baker,
Tennessee voters challenged the continued application of Tennessee's 1901
Apportionment Act.6 The plaintiffs contended that the use of a district map that
apportioned representatives according to sixty-year-old demographics, regard-
less of the substantial growth and redistribution of Tennessee's population,
violated their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment "by
virtue of the debasement of their votes."' In reversing the three-judge district
court panel's decision that the subject matter of such a suit presented a
non-justiciable political question, the Supreme Court noted that "the mere fact
that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a po-
litical question."' Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that justi-
ciability exists where "the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its
breach judicially determined," and where "protection for the right asserted can
be judicially molded."9 The Court held that the right asserted in this case,
though political, was nonetheless a right "within the reach of judicial protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment." 0
Not long after Baker, the Court faced a pair of cases that pushed for elabo-
ration on the meaning of a right to equal protection from vote dilution
under both Article I, Section 2, and the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wesberry v.
4. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-8o (1963)); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6. Id. at 192-93.
7. Id. at 192, 194 (quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 209.
9. Id. at 198.
10. Id. at 237.
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Sanders" and Reynolds v. Sims," the Court reviewed apportionment plans that
disproportionately allocated representatives in the United States Congress and
state legislatures, respectively. Both plans were struck down.
In Wesberry, Georgia voters challenged the congressional apportionment
created by a 1931 Georgia statute, which resulted in Georgia's fifth congressional
district having two to three times as many people as other districts in Georgia. 13
The Court held that the 1931 apportionment grossly discriminated against
Georgia voters by contracting the value of some votes and expanding that of
others. 14 The Court reasoned that such malapportionment contravened the
constitutional mandate under Article I that representatives be chosen "by the
People of the several States."" In other words, "as nearly as is practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." 6
The Court reinforced the "one-person, one-vote" principle shortly thereaf-
ter in Reynolds, and held as a "basic constitutional standard" that state legisla-
tures must be apportioned on a population basis.' In Reynolds, Alabama voters
challenged the continued use of districts apportioned after the 1900 census,
which, applying 1960 census figures, resulted in a majority of state legislators
representing only about a quarter of the total population.'" Relying on Wesber-
ry's precedent, the Court stated that "the fundamental principle of representa-
tive government in this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people."'9 The Court further elucidated: "The Equal Protection
Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation
for all citizens." 2 0
The Reapportionment Revolution was imperative in achieving equal repre-
sentation for voters across the country. But in the fifty years since the Court
established that it would protect the political right of equal voting power, the
goal of litigants has shifted from seeking quantitative equality, in the form of
equal representation, to seeking qualitative equality, or fair representation. In
cases challenging partisan gerrymanders, the pursuit of fair representation has
presented a particularly vexing problem.
11. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2.
14. Id. at 7.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
16. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8.
17. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (footnote omitted).
18. Id. at 545.
19. Id. at 560-61.
20. Id. at 568.
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B. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Push for Qualitative Equality
Since the Reapportionment Revolution, congressional and state legislative
districts have been drawn and re-drawn each decade to ensure that all voters
have the same amount of voting power: one-person, one-vote. Meanwhile,
federal courts have been tasked with delineating the constitutional limitations
of those redistricting efforts. From population variance to minority representa-
tion, political leaders have relied (sometimes voluntarily, sometimes not)" on
the judiciary to determine whether the latest gerrymandering scheme is per-
missible. The question presented in partisan gerrymandering claims is whether,
under the Equal Protection Clause, the allocation of partisan representation at
the state level is fair in light of the political makeup of the state.
Judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering claims started, as redistrict-
ing cases did generally, with a determination of justiciability. In the 1986 case
Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court considered whether a purely partisan
gerrymandering claim presents a justiciable case or controversy, or a nonjustici-
able political question.2 In Bandemer, Indiana Democrats had brought a claim
against state officials following the 1981 redistricting of state legislative seats,
alleging that the "reapportionment plans constituted a political gerrymander
intended to disadvantage Democrats." 23
In considering the question of whether discriminatory vote dilution had
occurred, the Court established a combination intent/effects test to determine
whether the district map constituted an impermissibly partisan gerrymander: In
order to prevail on a partisan gerrymandering claim, a plaintiff must show that
the districts were drawn with the intent to disadvantage a political group, and
that the map as drawn actually had the effect of discriminatory vote dilution.2 4
The Court specified that the discriminatory effect prong required proof that
"the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a
voter's or group of voters' influence on the political process . . . ."12 But the
21. Judicial intervention is often the result of one political party challenging a map
drawn by its opposition, as occurred in many of the cases discussed in this essay.
However, in cases dealing with jurisdictions covered by section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act-which requires preclearance by the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia for any change in a "standard, prac-
tice, or procedure with respect to voting"-judicial review is not voluntary. 42
U.S.C. § 1973a (Supp. 2010).
22. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 115.
24. Id. at 127.
25. Id. at 132.
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Court failed to make clear a standard by which one would prove such political
unfairness in order to trigger judicial intervention. 6
The implied promise of justiciability-i.e., the ability to present a partisan
gerrymandering claim to a court and have the alleged injury redressed-
lingered for some time without a single plaintiff successfully breaching the
effects test barrier. Federal courts considered allegations of discriminatory im-
pact arising from a variety of factual circumstances, but no cases presented suf-
ficient proof of discriminatory vote dilution according to Bandemer's effects test
in order to succeed on an equal protection claim.
The Supreme Court revisited the question of what constitutes sufficient
discriminatory impact in 2004 in Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case arising out of Penn-
sylvania's redistricting efforts following the 2000 Census.28 After census results
left Pennsylvania with two less congressional seats than it had previously held,
the Republican- dominated state legislature took up the task of drawing a new
map, adopting a partisan redistricting plan allegedly as a punitive measure
against Democrats for past pro-Democratic redistricting plans enacted
elsewhere.2 9 Against the resulting allegation of political gerrymandering, the
Court not only failed to develop an actual, practicable standard by which to
measure the political fairness-or lack thereof-of electoral outcomes, but it
also turned back to the debate over the existence of such a standard. Though
four Justices would have held that Bandemer was wrongly decided and that po-
litical gerrymandering claims are actually not justiciable because "no judicially
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering
26. While the Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under
the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 125, the facts of this particular case were not
ultimately sufficient to show discriminatory vote dilution. Id. at 129.
27. For example, shortly after the Court decided Bandemer, a court in California
rejected an equal protection claim based on disproportionate political results-
California Republicans had won 50.1% of the statewide vote, but only 40% (18 out
of 45) of the congressional seats. Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal.
1988), affd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). Despite the disproportionate election results, the
court concluded that 40% of congressional seats nonetheless still represented "a
sizeable bloc that is far more than mere token representation." Badham, 694 F.
Supp. at 672. More recently, in 2003 the Fourth Circuit rejected a discriminatory
impact argument based on the bizarreness of appearance of a district map. Duck-
worth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769, 775-76 (4th Cir. 2003).
The court commented that "the fact that members of a majority have acted politi-
cally is not evidence that they have caused discriminatory effects, even if their
actions are disfavored by the minority." Id. at 775. Rather, as the court explained,
bizarre looking congressional districts do not imply political discrimination
because "all affected voters still have a congressional representative [and] cast
equally weighted votes for that representative." Id. at 776.
28. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
29. Id. at 272.
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claims have emerged," 0 Justice Kennedy's fifth vote for the decision to dismiss
the complaint kept the promise of justiciability alive. In concurrence, Justice
Kennedy noted that the fact that an appropriate standard had not emerged did
not necessarily mean that no such standard could or would emerge in the
future: "If workable standards do emerge to measure the[] burdens" a gerry-
mander imposes on representational rights, he argued, "courts should be
prepared to order relief."3 While this outcome prevented the complete obstruc-
tion of judicial redress for excessive partisan gerrymanders, it muddied the
judicial waters for such claims even more.
The latest word on partisan gerrymandering claims came in 2oo6 in the
Court's determination of the redistricting litigation out of Texas. In League of
United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, the Court again sought to de-
termine whether a judicially manageable standard had been presented by which
it would be possible to measure allegations of unconstitutional partisan gerry-
manders.32 The plaintiffs presented two theories of discriminatory impact: First,
that the mere fact of the mid-decade redistricting proved that political power
was the sole motivating factor for redrawing the map,33 and second, that the
mid-decade redistricting effectuated a discriminatory impact based on
one-person, one-vote principles because the population had shifted since the
2000 Census results were published. The Court rejected both theories, but did
not revisit the more general question of justiciability.3 4
C. One Person, One Vote Standard Tightened Against Partisan
Gerrymanders
The one-person, one-vote principle developed over time into a clear body
of law requiring that, in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause, all
districts should have the same population to the extent practicable. The external
bounds of this requirement were set out in the Court's opinion in Karcher v.
Daggett.35 Under Karcher, any congressional district with a total population that
deviates more than one percent from the ideal district population (the total
population of the state divided by the number of districts) demands a legitimate
policy justification as to each overpopulated or underpopulated district.36 For
30. Id. at 281.
31. Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. 548 U.S. 399 (20o6).
33. Because redistricting must occur after each decennial Census, mid-decade redi-
stricting is not necessary and, as such, suggests motives other than adherence to
the constitutional requirement of equipopulation.
34. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414.
35. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
36. Id. at 740-41.
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state legislative districts, the threshold difference is more flexible at ten percent,
under which the state is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the district
plan was the result of an "'honest and good faith effort"' to reach population
equality among districts.3 7 Even where the population deviation threshold has
not been violated, however, courts have demanded justifications where political
manipulation is apparent."
In the absence of a judicially manageable standard to determine when
partisan bias becomes an equal protection violation, courts have in some cases
tightened the constitutional reins of one-person, one-vote to reject blatant
partisan gerrymanders. Two decisions in particular stand out in which excessive
partisan gerrymanders were struck down on one-person, one-vote grounds. In
Vieth v. Pennsylvania3 9 and Larios v. Cox, 40 federal courts in Pennsylvania and
Georgia, respectively, strictly applied equipopulation requirements to strike
down apportionment plans that resulted in extreme partisan bias.
In 2001, Republican legislators in Pennsylvania drew a map with a popula-
tion deviation of only nineteen people '-representing a difference of only
0.0029 percent from the ideal district population. In Vieth v. Pennsylvania, the
three-judge panel reviewing the map reasoned that, in Karcher, the Supreme
Court squarely rejected even the smallest deviation from absolute population
equality. Any deviation at all was to be avoided. The panel determined that the
state legislators who had drawn the map had not made a good faith effort to
avoid the deviation, shifting the burden to the state to present a legitimate justi-
fication.42 In defense, state legislators argued that this minor deviation was the
result of a desire to avoid splitting voting precincts, a legitimate state interest.
The panel was unconvinced, stating that the defense presented was "a mere
37. Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 577 (1964)).
38. Karcher itself is an example of the application of one-person, one-vote to an
apparent partisan gerrymander, with Justice Stevens noting in concurrence that
"the decisionmaking process leading to adoption of the challenged plan was far
from neutral." 462 U.S. at 764.
39. Vieth v. Pennsylvania (Vieth II), 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge
court). As discussed in the first iteration of this litigation, Pennsylvania voters
were nearly split along partisan lines, yet under the proposed map Democrats
were likely to win only six of the nineteen congressional seats. Vieth v. Pennsylva-
nia (Vieth 1), 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge court).
40. Larios v. Cox, 3oo F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three-judge court), summari-
ly affd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). The court here found that "[w]hile Democratic
incumbents who supported the plans were generally protected, Republican
incumbents were regularly pitted against one another in an obviously purposeful
attempt to unseat as many of them as possible." Id. at 1329.
41. Vieth II, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
42. Id. at 677.
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pretext." 43 The panel determined that, compared with alternative maps pre-
sented during trial, the challenged plan had the least compact districts, split the
most counties, and pitted more incumbents than necessary against one anoth-
er. 44
A similar situation occurred in the state legislative districting context in
Georgia in Larios v. Cox. In 2001, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a state
legislative apportionment plan with a total population deviation of 9.980o, just
below the ten percent threshold articulated in Daly v. Hunt.45 In Larios, the re-
viewing court noted that although minor deviations are allowed, district maps
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny if they are "tainted by arbitrariness or
discrimination."46 The panel found that the population deviations were not
supported by "any legitimate, consistently- applied state interests," but were ra-
ther the result of regionalism and partisan gerrymandering,47 and struck down
the plan as violating the one-person, one-vote principle.48 The Supreme Court
summarily affirmed.49
These cases evidence courts' willingness to subject partisan gerrymanders to
increased scrutiny when they violate other constitutional mandates, such as
one-person, one-vote. Even with this backstop possibility, however, state redi-
stricting efforts remain heavily motivated by partisan agendas.
II. PARTISAN PRIORITIES UNCHECKED
In the absence of a judicially manageable standard for federal courts to
measure partisan gerrymandering, the fate of even the most egregious partisan
gerrymander rises and falls on the ability of state legislators to effectively draw
maps without any (other) apparent constitutional or statutory defects. Redi-
stricters have been able to operate under the assumption that while courts may
redress extreme partisan gerrymandering, such a reality is unlikely. In other
words, as long as district maps comply with all clearly established constitutional
requirements, such as one-person, one-vote requirements, and comply with
statutory requirements under the Voting Rights Act, they are likely safe from
federal court challenges based on partisan gerrymandering.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 678.
45. 93 F-3d 1212 (4 th Cir. 1996).
46. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
47. Id. at 1352-53.
48. Id.
49. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
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The emergence of ever more sophisticated technology facilitating map-
drawing has made it increasingly easy for redistricters to comply with clearly
defined constitutional and statutory redistricting requirements. Advances in
redistricting technology allow a precise calibration of districts using the most
detailed and sophisticated election and demographic data ever available. 0 Redi-
stricters can all but guarantee compliance with the equipopulation requirement
of the Equal Protection Clause, minority representation in accordance with the
Voting Rights Act, and allegiance to traditional districting principles, such as
contiguity, compactness, and respect for existing local communities. But these
technological advances have also made it easier for state legislators to gerry-
mander congressional districts for maximum partisan advantage.
With no clear judicially manageable standard, and the technological ability
to produce otherwise- constitutionally sound maps, state legislators face little
fear of judicial scrutiny for extreme partisan gerrymanders. The redistricting
experiences in Florida, Michigan, and Texas following the 2000 U.S. Census
provide compelling examples of the danger of unfettered partisan redistricting.
Florida
The 2000 Census showed that population shifts over the prior decade
necessitated granting two additional congressional seats to Florida, resulting in
a total of twenty-five seats for the state." The Republican-controlled legislature
put together a map that paved the way for eighteen seats for Republicans and
seven for Democrats.5 ' This gave Republicans a seventy-two percent majority,
despite the fact that the Florida electorate split perfectly down the middle
during the 2000 presidential election.5 3
Michigan
In 2001, Michigan Republicans had the redistricting "trifecta": control over
both chambers of the state legislature, in addition to the governorship. In an
aggressive display of partisan gerrymandering, the new district map provided
ten districts likely to be carried by Republicans, and only five districts likely to
50. See Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manage-
able Standard and Other Reform Options For Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 243, 253 (2009).
51. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 2 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/20olpubs/c2kbrol-7.pdf.
52. Candidate Listing for 2oo2 General Election, FLA. DEPT STATE, DIVISION OF ELEC-
TIONS, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/candidate/Index.asp (choose "2002 Election"
from the dropdown list for General Election) (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
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be carried by Democrats.54 This provided a nearly 2-to-i advantage to the GOP,
despite a clear and increasing majority of Democratic voters in Michigan."
Texas
By far the most dramatic example of partisan gerrymandering since 2000
occurred in Texas. When state legislators were unable to come up with an
acceptable map after the 2000 Census results showed that Texas was to gain two
seats in the House of Representatives, litigation ensued resulting in a court-
ordered map." The court-drawn map largely kept in place a congressional map
that had been drawn in 1991,17 and as such resulted in the reelection of all
incumbents in 2002, an outcome that favored the Democrats. In 2003, however,
Texas Republicans gained control of both houses of the state legislature and set
out to enact a new congressional district map that would favor Republican
party members.'" The push to pass the new map into law became the redistrict-
ing scandal of the decade, including a dramatic twist when Democratic legisla-
tors twice fled the state en masse in an attempt to stop the Republicans from
achieving a quorum for the vote to institute the new map. 9 In the end, and
despite a legal challenge that made its way to the Supreme Court, the
mid-decade redistricting succeeded.60
54. Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in
the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 205 (2003).
The actual results were slightly less severe than expected, with six seats going to
Democrats and nine going to Republicans. See Federal Election 2002 U.S. House of
Representatives Results, FED. ELECTION COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/
fe2oo2/house.htm#mi (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). A map of Michigan's proposed
2001 Apportionment Plan can be found at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/
Congresso -state- E43697_7 .pdf.
55. Hirsch, supra note 46, at 205.
56. LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 411 (20o6).
57. Id. at 412.
58. Id.
59. Dems Flee Texas To Avoid Redistricting, USA TODAY, May 13, 2003, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2003-05-13-texas-lawmakers-x.htm
(last updated May 15, 2003); Democratic Lawmakers Flee Texas Again, USA TODAY,
July 28, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2oo3-07-28-texas-dems
x.htm (last updated July 29, 2003).
60. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 423 (holding that the Texas legislature's decision to draw new
districts mid-decade was not "sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable stan-
dard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders").
553
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
III. STATE-LEVEL REFORMS OFFER REALISTIC, MANAGEABLE SOLUTIONS
The Court's inability to present a clear stance on partisan gerrymandering
evidences the discordance of judicial management of electoral outcomes."
While those who feel partisan gerrymandering has gone too far patiently await
the Supreme Court's announcement of a judicially manageable standard for
partisan gerrymandering claims, state legislators across the country are engag-
ing in another round of redistricting battles following the release of 2010 Census
data. In those states whose populations have swelled the most over the last
decade, new congressional seats must be created. Texas has gained four seats,
Florida has gained two, and six states-Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, South Caro-
lina, Utah and Washington-have gained one each.62 Those states with the most
dwindling populations are faced with the unpleasant task of removing districts,
and with them, congresspersons. Ten states have lost congressional seats: Ohio
and New York have each lost two; Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have each lost one.6 It is
time to realize that the prescription for these growing pains is not dependence
on the courts, but rather state-level reforms that recalibrate the redistricting
process toward an emphasis on the preferences of voters, not elected officials.
The judiciary must, of course, remain indefatigably committed to enforcing
the equal protection of the right to vote for all citizens. As the Court recognized
in Reynolds, "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial
protection."6' Where and when "some limited and precise rationale" is found to
remedy an established constitutional violation,6 5 federal courts absolutely must
provide redress. In the meantime, however, we must refrain from leaning on
the courts to settle every partisan spat, or to draw a map when state legislators
fail to do so. The Court hesitates to enter the political thicket partly due to the
difficulty in articulating what precisely comprises an 'unfair' result, but also, as
noted in LULAC, "because drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the
most significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizen participation in
republican self-governance."66
61. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
62. For a detailed review of the 2010 Census results, and the corresponding gains and
losses of congressional seats, see Matt Bloch et al., Census 2olo: Gains and Losses in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2010/12/21/us/census-districts.html.
63. Id.
64. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
65. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 3o6 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 416 (20o6).
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It would be equally imprudent to wait for Congress to use its constitutional
authority under the Elections Clause to regulate the redistricting process.6 7
According to the Elections Clause, the power to regulate the time, places, and
manner of holding elections for senators and representatives resides in the state
legislatures.68 Congress retains Article I power, however, to "at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations." 9 Regulations might include the imposition of
transparency measures, the establishment of concrete standards for state legisla-
tive redistricting efforts, or the articulation of a civil cause of action for partisan
gerrymanders. Just this year, Representatives Jim Cooper and Heath Shuler
each proposed such types of legislation that would reform the redistricting
process on a national level: Representative Cooper's "Redistricting Transparen-
cy Act" would require open hearings and a public website in each state to allow
full public participation in the redistricting process.70 Representative Shuler's
"Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act" would require states to estab-
lish an independent, bipartisan commission to redraw congressional district
lines.71
Congressional reform would be an ideal solution to ensure a consistent
allocation of voting power nationwide, but this approach seems politically
untenable. The chances that such power will be exercised at this point in time
seem slim. Because of the inherent political implications of redistricting reform,
it remains an unpopular topic for many partisan players. None of the bills to
put constraints on gerrymandering introduced in the last two congressional
sessions in the House by former Tennessee Congressman John Tanner7' and
California Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren," and in the Senate by South Dakota
Senator Tim Johnson 74 even made it out of committee.
State government reforms, on the other hand, offer the most promising
avenue toward reducing excessive partisan gerrymandering. State legislatures
can improve the redistricting process by enacting processes that will allow each
state's residents to circumvent the political self-interest of partisan players. This
type of reform is most possible in direct democracy states, but the opportunity
is nonetheless available in other states to push the tide toward reform.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Redistricting Transparency Act of 2011, H.R. 419, 112th Cong. (2011).
71. Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act, H.R. 453, 112th Cong. (2011).
72. Redistricting Transparency Act of 2010, H.R. 4918, iiith Cong. (2010); Fairness
and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009, H.R. 3025, 111th Cong. (2009).
73. Redistricting Reform Act of 2010, H.R. 5596, iiith Cong. (2010).
74. Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009, S. 1332, iiith Cong.
(2009).
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IV. RECENT REFORMS PROVIDE GUIDANCE
While national reform efforts have failed in the last decade, there has been
some positive movement toward redistricting reform on the state level, which
provides compelling examples and leadership. In Arizona in 2000, and more
recently in California in 2010, voters expressed their disapproval of the political
manipulation that takes place in legislative redistricting by installing indepen-
dent commissions to take responsibility for drawing congressional and state leg-
islative maps.
During the 2000 general election, the people of Arizona passed Proposition
io6, a constitutional amendment "Relating to Ending the Practice of Gerry-
mandering and Improving Voter and Candidate Participation in Elections by
Creating an Independent Commission of Balanced Appointments to Oversee
the Mapping of Fair and Competitive Congressional and Legislative Districts."
The Commission is comprised of five appointees, no more than two from any
political party. The mandate of the Commission is "to administer the fair and
balanced redistricting of the Congressional and Legislative districts of the State
of Arizona."76
In 2010, California voters passed a ballot initiative that extended the reach
of the California Citizens Redistricting Commission (CCRC), which was origi-
nally created after the 2008 passage of the Voters FIRST Act." The Act initially
assigned responsibility to the Commission to draw state legislative districts;78
the 2010 ballot initiative expanded the Commission's scope to include congres-
sional redistricting.79 The language of the ballot initiative unequivocally voiced
distaste for politicians' ability to choose their own voters, noting that
"[a]llowing politicians to draw these districts, to make them safe for incum-
75. ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1; AN INITIATIVE MEASURE, ARIZ. PROP. 1o6 (2000),
available at http://azredistricting.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Proposition
-1061.pdf
76. To achieve this end, the Commission is tasked with creating congressional and
state legislative districts that are of equal population, are geographically compact
and contiguous, respect communities of interest, and use visible geographic
features. See ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://20o1.azredistricting
.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). The Commission should favor competitive dis-
tricts, ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, Pt. 2, § 1(14), and may not identify or consider the plac-
es of residence of incumbents or candidates, id. § 1(15). Party registration and vot-
ing history data are excluded from the initial phase of the mapping process,
though such data may be used after the fact to test maps for compliance with the
stated goals. Id.




79. CAL. CONST. art. 21, § 1.
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bents, or to tailor the districts for the election of themselves or their friends, or
to bar the districts to the election of their adversaries, is a serious abuse that
harms voters."SO
Non-commission-based state reforms have been initiated in recent years as
well. In 2010, Florida voters passed the Fair Districts Florida Initiative, replacing
vague, limitless standards with concrete requirements that the legislature must
satisfy when redistricting." While this reform did not take redistricting out of
the hands of the legislature, the goal was similarly to curb excessive political
gerrymandering by barring the legislature from intentionally favoring one in-
cumbent or one political party over another." It remains to be seen how this
reform will play out in the post-2010 process, but the reform is an important
step toward reining in the extremely partisan strategies employed by state legis-
lators during the redistricting process.
The common thread in these reform states is the existence of a referendum
process. The availability of mechanisms of direct democracy, which allow voters
to bypass self-interested politicians, is an invaluable asset when it comes to
reforming congressional and state legislative apportionment.83 In states without
a referendum process, the road to reform is much more difficult. Even in states
that have successfully experimented with redistricting contests, allowing ordi-
nary citizens an opportunity to try to produce a fair map for their state, reform
remains just out of reach.4 State legislatures can be hostile environments for
redistricting reform legislation because many state legislators look to draw
districts for themselves. This is particularly the case in states where term limits
push state legislators to look to opportunities in Congress to further their polit-
ical careers.
80. Voters FIRST Act for Congress, Cal. Prop. 20, § 2(a) (2010), available at
http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop20.
81. FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 20; Standards for Legislature To Follow in Congressional Redi-
stricting 07-15, FLA. DEP'T STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail
.asp?account=43605&seqnum=i (last visited May 1, 2001). These standards include
the requirement that districts do not favor or disfavor any incumbent or political
party; racial or language minorities must not be denied equal opportunity to par-
ticipate; and districts must be contiguous, compact, and as equal in population as
feasible.
82. FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 20(a).
83. For a thorough discussion of redistricting commissions passed by ballot initiative,
see Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives To
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331 (2007).
84. See, e.g., Ohio Redistricting Competition, OHIO SECRETARY OF ST., http://www.sos
.state.oh.us/sos/redistricting.aspx. (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
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CONCLUSION
The gerrymandering of electoral boundaries by political officeholders is
incompatible with representative government because meaningful choice is
often removed from the hands of the voters. Politicians use the redistricting
process to create safe districts for themselves and their party brethren, and the
problem of self-interested gerrymandering has arguably gotten worse, not
better. The result of partisan gerrymandering is greater incumbent protection
and less electoral competition. While there are undoubtedly very good reasons
why voters might choose to elect incumbents-experience, seniority, and insti-
tutional knowledge are valuable commodities in a government body as large
and complex as the House of Representatives-the House is meant to be the
branch of the federal government that is most responsive to changing voter
preferences. The decision whether to reelect must remain in the hands of the
voters. Voter choices are increasingly irrelevant in a process in which politicians
decide the fate of the voters-and not the other way around. This is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with American democratic ideals.
State reforms are essential in the drive to push away from the perils of
politically-driven redistricting. These reforms provide needed examples of dif-
ferent approaches to redistricting, offering guidance to voters and elected offi-
cials in those states that continue to eschew reform. State-level redistricting
reform, particularly in the form of independent redistricting commissions, is
absolutely necessary in order to fulfill the promise of government for the
people, by the people.
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